Putin Ends the InterregnumBlurred Lines Between War and PeaceObserving the authoritarian experiments of these two serious global actors (although one of them has been weakened), as well as their search for an appropriate international role, has made for interesting viewing, revealing several paradoxes: first, the paradox of stability covering up a deeper instability and impending upheavals; second, the paradox of economic growth that is most likely only a brief respite before a precipitous fall; third, the paradox of outward displays of force that conceal inner weakness and disorientation. These paradoxes illustrate that there is a conflict between perceptions and reality in these two authoritarian states. The only question is to what extent they are the results of conscious distortions of reality as opposed to naivety or unwillingness to accept inconvenient truths.Were Arnold Toynbee alive today, a comparison of Russia and China would provide him with ample material for his theories on the rise and fall of civilizations. Perhaps, Samuel Huntington would have revised some of his conclusions on reform from the top and the role of the middle class in modernization. I hope, too, that Francis Fukuyama will have a chance to compare the modern evolutions of Russia and China, and their systems’ struggles for survival, in the upcoming second volume of The Origins of Political Order.The West should be particularly concerned about the future of these two models of the centralized state. The impact that Russia and China have on global security and the world economy is not the only cause for concern. More importantly, both authoritarian systems have found a way to exploit liberal democracy, and both have been quite successful at doing this. Since the fall of Communism, Russia’s personalized regime has been able to use the West as an important guarantor of its stability. It has also been sponging off liberal democracies, in the form of its elite’s personal integration into Western society. This integration has led to the creation of powerful pro-Kremlin lobbying structures that are undermining the normative foundation of liberal democracy (in fact, the Western politicians often don’t even recognize that this is what is happening). It is unclear how the Putin regime will play out after this cooperative 2 and a half hour legnthy discussion . It's false charm of a trained KGB with an uncanny poker face for the onlooker to discern the legitimacy of the Putin intentions to curtail a disposition of "non-interference,' rather the untrained Trump , easily deceived , by the perhaps wolf and sheeps clothing, aka Vlad Putin, only time will tell if and end to syria war games can happen peacefully ... With natrual gas pipelines and the profiting of lng/oil exporting/ and fueling of ablymissal Europe , it's highly unlikely that the Telerson hopeful narative has any and all hope in playing out in cooperative affair... Perhaps if Russia and the U.s. split the europe lng exports in half, $$ 50/50 , perhaps if they are will to share in profits maybe then a willingness to tame the Russia/U.S retheroic.
When Russia and China come up as subjects in the media and in political and academic discourse (as they frequently do), they are discussed in terms of bilateral relations, as a segue into a discussion of regional and global politics, as authoritarian threats to the West, or as examples of attempts at authoritarian modernization. Ever since Bobo Lo and I endeavored to compare Russia’s and China’s roads to modernization (see “A 21st Century Myth: Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China”), I cannot help feeling that a comparison of these two civilizations and their centralized states, as they both look for an appropriate response to the Western democracies, would reveal not only the dramas of undemocratic societies and an understanding of the limitations of modernization efforts by top-down governments, but also the challenges that the West faces—challenges that it is, to date, incapable of assessing correctly.
ON July 4th, 2017 China, (Shoigu) and Russia (Antonov) were advocating an alliance, and Moscow was
selling China the crown jewels of Russian defense production like the S-400 air defense
system, the Su-35 fighter plane, and the Amur-class submarine. Regular joint naval
exercises have now taken place, not only in the Far East but also in the Mediterranean,
signifying Russian acceptance of China’s interests there and desire to lean on Chinese
power in the Levant. Indeed, as a result of these exercises, including the most recent,
Aerospace Security-2016, Russia may now sell China the nuclear capable Kalibr’ cruise
missile for use on Russian-made Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, even as Russia for
its own purposes continues the ongoing combined arms buildup of its Far Eastern Military
District (FEMD) and overall military buildup. [102] The Russian Pacific Fleet also joined
with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recently to sail into the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, provoking a significant Japanese response—an action that
appears senseless unless the military and the government are trying to intimidate Japan into
an agreement with Russia. [103] But Russia appears to have second thoughts. It backed
out, for now, from selling highly capable rocket engines to China, something that had
hitherto not been the case. [104] Still, a recent Russo-Chinese aerospace simulation drill of
a joint response to a ballistic missile attack—clearly intended against the US—indicated
“a new level of trust” between these governments, which shared highly sensitive
information on missile-launch warning systems and ballistic missile defense. This
“indicates something beyond simple cooperation,” according to Vasily Kashin, an analyst
at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, in Moscow. [105]
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